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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of population dynamics with differential fertility between the 
educated and the uneducated on intergenerational mobility, income inequality and economic 
development in an overlapping generations framework. Population dynamics has two effects on 
the economy: the direct effect on the educated share through changing in population size of the 
economy as whole, and the indirect effect on the educated share through decreasing/increasing 
transfer per child. When population growth increases sufficiently, the mobility and income 
inequality exhibit cyclical behavior due to rapidly decreasing transfer per child and population 
size. In contrast, when population growth decreases sufficiently, the mobility and income 
inequality monotonically approach steady state and the economy has low steady state with high 
population growth and income inequality, and high steady state with low population growth and 
income inequality. As a result, population dynamics with economic development plays crucial 
role in the transitional dynamics of mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
Interest in intergenerational mobility, along with income inequality, is growing in in a wide range 
of fields, including sociology, demographics and economics. Intergenerational mobility is 
important not only in considering intergenerational equity and efficiency but also in analyzing 
economic development. The relationship between fertility and intergenerational mobility has also 
long been argued in many fields: sociology, demographics, social biology and economics. If 
parents limit family size, i.e. parents decrease the number of children, transfers per child, 
educational investment and bequest for children, increases and therefore intergenerational 
upward-mobility will increase. This hypothesis is called “family size limitation hypothesis” in 
literature of intergenerational mobility in sociology.1 Van Bavel (2006) and Van Bavel et al. 
(2014) find that family size limitation has strong effect on intergenerational mobility in Belgium. 
Lindahl also shows that increase in fertility prevents the upward-mobility from the rich (or the 
educated) to the poor (or the uneducated) in Sweden. Although many empirical studies have 
indicated the strong relationship, there are few theoretical studies explaining these interactions. 
This paper analyzes that the effects of population dynamics with differential fertility between the 
educated and the uneducated on intergenerational mobility, income inequality and economic 
development and shows their interactions. 
 The seminal work by Maoz and Moav (1999) focus on the incentive of income 
inequality for acquiring education and analyzes the relationship intergenerational mobility, 
income inequality and economic growth in simple overlapping generations framework. They 
show the mobility monotonically increases with decreasing income inequality as the economy 
grows. Hence, as empirical studies have indicated, they demonstrate that the mobility is 
negatively correlated with income inequality. In contrast, Nakamura and Murayama (2011) focus 
on the education cost in Maoz and Moav (1999) model. Assuming general cost function, they 
show that the behavior of education cost plays crucial role in the transitional dynamics of the 
mobility. Owen and Weil (1999) and Galo and Zeira (1993) analyze the dynamics of mobility in 
an economy with imperfect capital market. Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) Uchida (2018) analyzes 
the effect of private and/or public education on the mobility in the economy with the mismatch of 
talents. In this frame work, Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) show expanding public education 
decreases the mismatch and therefore encourages the mobility, while Uchida (2019) indicate that 
the transitional dynamics of the mobility depend on political power between the educated and the 
uneducated incorporating private education and voting on public education into Bernasoni and 
Profeta (2012). Hassler et al. (2007) and Murayama (2018) analyze the effects of fiscal policy on 
the mobility and income inequality. Hassler et al. (2007) show that educational subsidies make a 
 
1 In economics, this is known as “Quality and Quantity hypothesis” in the literature of human capital 
accumulation. 
difference in income the mobility and income inequality around each countries. Introducing 
governmental cash transfers into Maoz and Moav (1999) model, Murayama (2018) show that 
larger transfers to children with higher ability encourage upward mobility and growth if the 
economy has low income inequality. 
 Many previous theoretical studies analyze intergenerational mobility and income 
inequality by focusing on education system, education cost, liquidity constraint and fiscal policies. 
To our knowledge, few theoretical papers analyze the relationship between population dynamics 
and intergenerational mobility. An exception is Aso and Nakamura (2019). Aso and Nakamura 
(2019) analyze the effect of population growth on the mobility. However, they assume exogenous 
fertility difference between workers and worker’s and exogenous worker’s wages and therefore 
do not adequately analyze the effects of population dynamics with economic development on the 
mobility and income inequality. In fact, we show population dynamics plays crucial role in the 
transitional dynamics of mobility, income inequality and economic development and therefore 
various transitional dynamics of the economy appears in this paper. 
 The purpose of this paper analyzes the effect of population dynamics on the mobility, 
income inequality and economic development and show their interactions. For the purpose of our 
analysis, we employ the (endogenous) differential fertility in Maoz and Moav (1999) model. Our 
results are summarized as follows. (i) differential fertility between the educated and the 
uneducated depend crucially on the elasticity of substitution between consumption, transfer for 
children and the number of children. (ii) Population dynamics has two effect on the economy: the 
direct effect on the educated share through changing population size of the economy as a whole, 
and the indirect effect on the educated share through increasing/decreasing transfer per child. (iii) 
When the elasticity of substitution is enough larger than unity, i.e., the fertility of the educated is 
enough larger than that of the uneducated and therefore population growth increases sufficiently, 
the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior due to rapidly decreasing population 
effect and transfer per child. (iv) In contrast, when the elasticity of substitution is enough smaller 
than unity, i.e., the fertility of the uneducated is enough larger than that of the educated and 
therefore population growth decreases sufficiently, the mobility and income inequality 
monotonically approach steady state and the economy may have two steady state: low steady state 
with high population growth and income inequality, and high steady state with low population 
growth and income inequality.  
 In fact, various patterns of intergenerational mobility have been observed in developed 
countries. Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) find monotonous decrease in Britain, while Bratberg et 
al. (2007) indicate monotonous increase in Norway. Aaronson and Mazumber (2008) show that 
the mobility has changed non-monotonous motion in the USA. This paper presents one 
contribution to their explanation. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 
analyzes the transitional dynamics of the economy. Section 4 examines the transitional dynamics 
of the economy using numerical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
Consider the competitive equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous 
fertility. Each individual lives for two periods. In the first period, she does not work, receives a 
transfer from her parent. I t is used for consumption and possible education. In the second period, 
she has children, works and divides her income between consumption, child costs and transfer for 
her children.  
 
 
2.1 Technology and factor prices 
we assume that aggregate output in period 𝑡 is characterized by the following constant returns 
to scale production function.  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐸𝑡1−𝛼𝑈𝑡𝛼, 𝐴 > 0 ,   0 < 𝛼 < 1 (1) 
where 𝐸𝑡 is the number of educated workers, and 𝑈𝑡 is the number of uneducated workers. 
Adult population is in period 𝑡, 𝑁𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡. Therefore, per capita output becomes 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝜆𝑡𝛼(1 − 𝜆𝑡)1−𝛼,  (2) 
where 𝜆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 𝑁𝑡⁄  is the population share of the educated. Similarly, (1 − 𝜆𝑡) = 𝑈𝑡 𝑁𝑡⁄  is the 
population share of the uneducated worker. Hence, we have following in equilibrium: 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴 (1 − 𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑡 )𝛼 (3) 
 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 𝛼𝐴(1 − 𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑡 )𝛼−1 (4) 
where subscripts 𝑒 and 𝑢 denote “educated” and “uneducated,” respectively. Hence, the wage 
inequality becomes: 
 
𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝜆𝑡𝜆𝑡 ). (5) 
To ensure that 𝑤𝑡𝑒 > 𝑤𝑡𝑢, we assume that 𝜆𝑡 < 1 − 𝛼. 
 
2.2 Individuals 
Individuals derive utility from consumption 𝑐𝑡  of an individual born in period 𝑡 , 
consumption 𝑐𝑡+1 in period 𝑡 + 1 , transfer for children 𝑏𝑡+1 and their number of children 𝑛𝑡+1. The preference is assumed to be represented by CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) 
type utility function: 
 𝑢𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 {[(𝑐𝑡+1)𝛽(𝑏𝑡+1)1−𝛽]𝜎−1𝜎 + (𝑛𝑡+1)𝜎−1𝜎 } 𝜎𝜎−1, (6) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1  and 𝜎 > 0 . 𝜎  stands for the elasticity of substitution between (𝑐𝑡+1)𝛽(𝑏𝑡+1)1−𝛽 and 𝑛𝑡+1. To focus on the role of 𝜎, we assume that the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and transfer is independent demand for children 𝑛𝑡+1.2 
 Let ℎ𝑡𝑖  and 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖  denote the education cost of individual 𝑖, born in period 𝑡 and her 
wage in period 𝑡 + 1. Assuming no capital market in the economy, if she acquires education, her 
budget constraints are 
 𝑐𝑡𝑖 + ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖, 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 , (7.a) 
where 𝑖 ∈ {𝑒, 𝑢}, subscript 𝑒 stands for “educated” and subscript 𝑢 stands for “uneducated”. 𝑥𝑡𝑖 = 𝑏𝑡𝑖 𝑛𝑡𝑖⁄  is transfer per child and 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖  is non-negligible cost for rearing children, 
where 0 < 𝛾 < 1. We assume that 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 < 1 𝛾⁄  always holds in the following. If she does not 
acquire education, her budget constraint become 
 𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖, 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 , (7.b) 
Since we assume there is no capital market, the utility maximization problem can be solved 
backwards in two stages. First, each individual considers optimal allocation in the second period. 
Then, each individual decides whether to acquire education in the first period. 
 Suppose that the utility maximization problem of the second period. Following 
Nakamura (2018), we can solve the utility maximization of second period in two steps. At the 
first step, each individual determines optimal consumption 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖  and transfer for children 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖  
assuming that the number of children 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖  has been optimally chosen. 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 ,𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 (𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 )𝛽(𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 )1−𝛽     subject to 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 , 
Hence, optimal consumption and transfer for children become 
 
2 With 𝜎 → 1, the utility function becomes the Cobb-Douglas function. This type of utility function is 
used in Borck (2011) and Nakamura (2018). 
 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝛽(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ), (8) 
 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖 = (1 − 𝛽)(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ). (9) 
Substituting (8) and (9) into the utility function of the second period, we can represent it as a 
function of 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖  as follows. 
 𝑣(𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 ) = [?̃?(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎−1𝜎 + (𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎−1𝜎 ] 𝜎𝜎−1, (10) 
where ?̃? = [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽)1−𝛽]𝜎−1𝜎  . At the second step, each individual chooses the number of 
children 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖  so as to maximize (10). Hence, 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 [?̃?(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎−1𝜎 + (𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎−1𝜎 ] 𝜎𝜎−1  .  
The first-order condition is 
 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 = (?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )−𝜎[𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ] (11) 
From (11), we obtain the following: 
 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 + (?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎. (12) 
From (9) and (12), transfer per child become 
 𝑥𝑡𝑖 = 𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 = (1 − 𝛽)(?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡𝑖)𝜎 (13) 
Differentiating (12) with respect to 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 , we obtain 
 
𝜕𝑛𝑡+1𝑖𝜕𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 = (?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎(1 − 𝜎)[𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 + (?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )𝜎]2   ⋛ 0  ⟺   𝜎 ⋚ 1 , (14) 
When income rises, whether the number of children increases or decreases depend on the 
elasticity of substitution 𝜎 . Since 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖  , 𝑏𝑡+1𝑖   and 𝑛𝑡+1𝑖   is normal goods, rise in income 
increases the number of children due to income effect. On the other hand, rise in income has 
substitution effect. A rise in income increases the cost of rearing children and therefore each 
individual substitutes the number of children by consumption and transfer for children to prevent 
a decline in utility.3 Hence, we have following the proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 Differential the fertility between the educated and the uneducated depend on 
the substitution elasticity 𝜎. When 𝜎 < 1, since the income effect is dominant, the fertility of the 
educated is larger than that of the uneducated. When 𝜎 > 1 , since the substitution effect is 
dominant, the fertility of the uneducated is larger than that of the educated. When 𝜎 = 1, since 
the income effect and the substitution effect are offset, the fertility of the educated equals that of 
the uneducated, that is, there is no differential the fertility between income classes. 
 
2.3 Education choice 
In this subsection, we consider individual’s education choice in first period. Substituting (12) into 
(10), we obtain indirect utility function: 
 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) = {?̃?[𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 − 𝛾𝑛𝑖(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ]𝜎−1𝜎 + [𝑛𝑖(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 )]𝜎−1𝜎 } 𝜎𝜎−1. (15) 
If the utility derived from investing in education is higher than or equal to the utility derived from 
not investing in education, then individual 𝑖 will acquire education. Thus, if the following holds, 
then individual 𝑖 acquires education. 
 (𝑥𝑡𝑖 − ℎ𝑡𝑖) 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 ) ≥ 𝑥𝑡𝑖  𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 ).  
or 
 ℎ𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )]. (16) 
Hence, we have the following critical value of education cost ℎ̂𝑡𝑖  for individual 𝑖 : 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )] , (17) 
where 𝜕𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) 𝜕𝑤𝑡+1𝑖⁄ > 0 and 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 ) > 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 ). In addition to transfer per child 𝑥𝑡𝑖, as 
can be seen from (18), the wage inequality 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢⁄  plays an important role in education 
choice. The higher 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢⁄  is, the higher 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 ) 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )⁄  is, and therefore the larger the 
incentive to acquire education.  
Suppose that ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 (ℎ̂𝑡𝑢) is the critical value of educational cost for the individual born to 
 
3 When 𝜎 = 1, the the fertility between the educated and the uneducated is the same 𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝑛𝑡 = 1 2𝛾⁄  and become constant over time. 
an educated (uneducated) worker to acquire education. Then, from (17), 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝛽)(?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡𝑒)𝜎 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )], (18) 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 = (1 − 𝛽)(?̃?𝛾𝑤𝑡𝑢)𝜎 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )] . (19) 
 
2.4 Education cost among individuals 
Following Maoz and Moav (1999), the following cost is assumed to be incurred for the education 
of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
 ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝑐(?̅?𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡), (20) 
where 𝜃𝑖 is a parameter representing individual 𝑖′𝑠 ability to learn; the higher the ability, the 
lower is the value of 𝜃𝑖. We further assume that 𝜃𝑖 is uniformly distributed in the interval (𝜃, 𝜃), 
regardless of the ability and class of the parents in any period. Hence, ℎ𝑡𝑖  is also uniformly 
distributed in the interval (ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡), where ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡) and ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡). 
 
2.5 Population growth 
Adult population in period 𝑡 + 1 is 𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝑈𝑡+1 or 𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑈𝑡. Therefore, 
the population growth as a whole in period 𝑡, ?̅?𝑡 becomes 
 ?̅?𝑡 = ?̅?(𝜆𝑡) = 𝑛𝑡𝑒𝜆𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡𝑢(1 − 𝜆𝑡). (21) 
When the educated share 𝜆𝑡 increases, the behavior of population growth ?̅?𝑡 can be expressed 
as follows. 
 
𝜕?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝜕𝜆𝑡 = [(1 − 𝜆𝑡) 𝜕𝑛𝑡𝑢𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑢 𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑢𝜕𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡 𝜕𝑛𝑡𝑒𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑒 𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑒𝜕𝜆𝑡 ] + (𝑛𝑡𝑒 − 𝑛𝑡𝑢) (22) 
From (14), the following holds: 
 (1 − 𝜆𝑡) 𝜕𝑛𝑡𝑢𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑢 𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑢𝜕𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡 𝜕𝑛𝑡𝑒𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑒 𝜕𝑤𝑡𝑒𝜕𝜆𝑡 ⋛ 0  ⟺   𝜎 ⋚ 1 , (23) 
 𝑛𝑡𝑒 − 𝑛𝑡𝑢 ⋛ 0  ⟺   𝜎 ⋚ 1 .  
Thus, the behavior of population growth ?̅?𝑡 becomes 
 
𝜕?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝜕𝜆𝑡 ⋛ 0  ⟺   𝜎 ⋚ 1 (24) 
As can be seen from (24), the elasticity of substitution 𝜎 plays crucial role in dynamics of 
population growth. Thus, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 The dynamics of population growth depends on substitution elasticity 𝜎 . 
When 𝜎 < 1(𝜎 > 1) , since the fertility of the educated is larger (smaller) than that of the 
uneducated, population growth increases (decreases) with increase in the educated share. When 𝜎 = 1, population growth is constant over since the fertility between income classes is the same. 
 
 
3. The dynamics of the model 
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of intergenerational mobility, income inequality and 
population growth. At the first step, we show intergenerational mobility in the model. 
 
3.1 Intergenerational mobility 
The dynamics of 𝐸𝑡 can be expressed as 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑡𝑒𝐸𝑡 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑈𝑡 𝑞𝑡 , (25) 
where 
 𝑝𝑡 = ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 = ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 , (26) 
The first term in the right-hand side of (25) represents individuals born to the educated acquiring 
education, while the second term represents individuals born to the uneducated acquiring 
education. The dynamics of the educated share 𝜆𝑡 is obtained by dividing both sides by the total 
working population in period 𝑡 + 1; 𝑁𝑡+1 = ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝑁𝑡. 
 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝑡  𝑛𝑡𝑒?̅?(𝜆𝑡)  𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡) 𝑛𝑡𝑢?̅?(𝜆𝑡) 𝑞𝑡  . (27) 
From (22), if 𝜆𝑡 = 0, then 𝜆𝑡+1 = 0. Eq. (27) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
𝜆𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝑡) 𝑛𝑡𝑢?̅?(𝜆𝑡) 𝑞𝑡⏟          𝑈𝑀𝑡 − [𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡  𝑛𝑡
𝑒?̅?(𝜆𝑡) 𝑝𝑡]⏟            𝐺𝐷𝑀𝑡 , (28) 
where 𝑈𝑀𝑡 is upward-mobility and 𝐺𝐷𝑀𝑡 is gross downward-mobility. In our model, upward-
mobility means that individuals born to an uneducated parent become educated workers, while 
gross downward-mobility means that how much individuals born to educated parent increases or 
decreases compared to educated workers of parents’ generation. Upward-mobility equals to gross 
downward-mobility in steady state; 𝑈𝑀𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑀𝑡. Moreover, we can rewrite (28) as follows. 
 
𝜆𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆𝑡) 𝑛𝑡𝑢?̅?(𝜆𝑡) 𝑞𝑡⏟          𝑈𝑀𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑡) 𝑛𝑡
𝑒?̅?(𝜆𝑡)⏟          𝐷𝑀𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡 [1 − 𝑛𝑡
𝑒?̅?(𝜆𝑡)]⏟        𝑃𝐸𝑡  , (29) 
where 𝐷𝑀𝑡  is (net) downward-mobility and 𝑃𝐸𝑡  is population effect. Downward-mobility 
means that individuals born to an educated parent become uneducated workers. On the other hand, 
population effect represents the effect of increase or decrease in population growth on the 
educated share in the economy. Increase (decrease) in population growth, regardless of the 
mobility, directly decreases (increases) the educated share through increasing (decreasing) in 
population size of the economy as a whole. We call the effect “Population effect” and define the 
sum of the downward-mobility and the population effect as the gross downward-mobility in this 
paper. When 𝜎 < 1 (𝜎 > 1 ), i.e., the fertility of the educated is larger (smaller) than population 
growth; population effect is negative (positive); 𝑃𝐸𝑡 < 0 (𝑃𝐸𝑡 > 0).4 It implies that 𝜆𝑡+1 is 
larger than 𝜆𝑡 since 𝑛𝑡𝑒 > (<)?̅?(𝜆𝑡) . Hence, the larger difference between the fertility of the 
educated and population growth facilitates larger population effect, while population effect is 
smaller with increase in the educated share since the difference narrows. 
 If there is no upward-mobility and downward-mobility (𝑞𝑡 ≤  1 and 𝑝𝑡 ≥ 1 ) in the 
economy, then the educated share in period 𝑡 + 1; 𝜆𝑡+1 depends on only the population effect.5 
 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝑡  𝑛𝑡𝑒?̅?(𝜆𝑡) . (30) 
Hence, whether the educated share in period 𝑡 + 1; 𝜆𝑡+1 increases or decreases compared to the 
educated share in period 𝑡; 𝜆𝑡 depends on whether the fertility of the educated is larger than 
population growth. If 𝑞𝑡 ≤ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑡 ≥ 1, then 
 𝜆𝑡+1 ⋛ 𝜆𝑡   ⟺  𝑛𝑡𝑒 ⋛ ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)  ⟺  𝜎 ⋚ 1.  (31) 
Thus, when 𝜎 > 1 , if there is no upward-mobility in the economy, the economy falls into a 
poverty trap due to population effect. In this paper, poverty trap refers to a state in which the 
 
4 If 𝑛𝑡𝑒 ⋛ ?̅?(𝜆𝑡), then 𝑛𝑡𝑒 ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)⁄ ⋛ 1 and therefore 𝑃𝐸𝑡 ⋚ 0. 
5 If there is no population effect, (30) is 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝜆𝑡. 
educated share decreases due to population effect and approaches 𝜆𝑡 = 0 in the long run.6 
 
Proposition 3 When 𝜎 < 1 , since the fertility of the educated is larger than population 
growth, the economy does not fall into poverty trap due to population growth even without 
upward-mobility. In contrast, when 𝜎 > 1 and there is no upward-mobility, since the fertility of 
the population growth is larger than the fertility of the educated, the economy falls into poverty 
trap due to population growth. 
 
Taking into account ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡), ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡), (18) and (19), Eq. (27) can be written 
as follows: 
 𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝜆𝑡+1)(𝜃 − 𝜃) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝑐(𝑦𝑡)?̅?(𝜆𝑡) − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃, (32) 
where 𝑓(𝜆𝑡+1) = [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 ) 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )⁄ ]  and ?̅?(𝜆𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡𝑏𝑡𝑒 + (1 − 𝜆𝑡)𝑏𝑡𝑢  is average of 
transfer per child. 
 
3.2 Transitional dynamics 
The dynamics of 𝜆𝑡 is given by (32). We can express Eq. (32) as an implicit function. 
 𝐺(𝜆𝑡+1, 𝜆𝑡  ) = 𝜆𝑡+1 − 𝑓(𝜆𝑡+1)(𝜃 − 𝜃) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝑐(𝑦𝑡)?̅?(𝜆𝑡) + 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃 = 0 (33) 
Investigating Eq. (33), we can see the dynamic behavior of intergenerational mobility, inequality, 
population dynamics and the process of economic development. Totally differentiating Eq. (33), 
 𝐺1𝑑𝜆𝑡+1 = 𝐺2𝑑𝜆𝑡, (34) 
where 
 𝐺1 = 1 − 𝑓′(𝜆𝑡+1)(𝜃 − 𝜃) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)𝑐(𝑦𝑡) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡) > 0, (35) 
and 𝑓′(𝜆𝑡+1) < 0, and therefore 𝐺1 > 0, 
 𝐺2 = 𝑓(𝜆𝑡+1)(𝜃 − 𝜃) 𝜀𝑡?̅? − 𝜀𝑡𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡?̅?𝑐(𝑦𝑡) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡) 𝜆𝑡  ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)⁄ , (36) 
and 
 
6 In section 4, we illustrate an example of poverty trap using numerical analysis. 
 𝜀𝑡?̅? = 𝜕?̅?(𝜆𝑡) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)⁄𝜕𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑡⁄ = ?̅?′(𝜆𝑡) 𝜆𝑡?̅?(𝜆𝑡) > 0, (37) 
 𝜀𝑡𝑐 = 𝜕𝑐(𝑦𝑡) 𝑐(𝑦𝑡)⁄𝜕𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑡⁄ = 𝑐′(𝑦𝑡) 𝑦𝑡′  𝜆𝑡𝑐(𝑦𝑡) > 0, (38) 
 𝜀𝑡?̅? = 𝜕?̅?(𝜆𝑡) ?̅?(𝜆𝑡)⁄𝜕𝜆𝑡 𝜆𝑡⁄ = ?̅?′(𝜆𝑡) 𝜆𝑡?̅?(𝜆𝑡)  ⋛  0   ⇔   𝜎 ⋚ 1. (39) 𝜀𝑡?̅? represents the elasticity of average of transfer per child with respect to the share of the 
educated in period 𝑡, 𝜀𝑡𝑐 represents the elasticity of education cost with respect to the share of 
the educated in period 𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡?̅? represents the elasticity of population growth with respect to 
the share of the educated in period 𝑡. Since 𝐺1 > 0, the behavior of 𝜆𝑡 depend on sign of 𝐺2, 
i.e., the sum of each elasticity. 
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝑑𝜆𝑡+1𝑑𝜆𝑡 ] = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝐺2𝐺1] = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[𝜀𝑡?̅? − 𝜀𝑡𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡?̅?]. (40) 
In particular, the elasticity of population growth with respect to the share of the educated 𝜀𝑡?̅? 
plays an important role in the transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡. Population growth directly influences 
the educated share through changing in population size of the economy as a whole. On the other 
hand, increasing in population growth decreases transfer per child and therefore discourages the 
mobility. When population growth decreases, the opposite holds. If population growth decreases 
sufficiently , then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = [𝜀𝑡?̅? − 𝜀𝑡𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡?̅?]⁄ > 0; and hence Eq. (29) is upwards-sloping in the (𝜆𝑡, 𝜆𝑡+1)  plane. In contrast, if population growth increases sufficiently, then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = [𝜀𝑡?̅? − 𝜀𝑡𝑐 − 𝜀𝑡?̅?]⁄ < 0; and hence, Eq. (30) is downwards-sloping in the (𝜆𝑡, 𝜆𝑡+1) plane. 
As a result, the following proposition holds about the transitional dynamics of intergenerational 
mobility, income inequality and population growth.7 
 
Proposition 4 The transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility depends on the sum of 
each elasticities, i.e., the elasticity of average of transfer per child with respect to the share of the 
educated, the elasticity of education cost with respect to the share of the educated and the elasticity 
of population growth with respect to the share of the educated. In particular, when the fertility of 
the uneducated is greatly larger than that of the educated, that is, population growth decreases 
 
7 When the fertility between income classes is the same, population growth does not influence the basic 
dynamics of the economy. Then, the transitional dynamics of the mobility depends on income share of 
education cost. 
sufficiently, the mobility monotonically increases and therefore income inequality decreases. In 
contrast, when the fertility of the educated is greatly larger than that of the uneducated, that is, 
population growth increases sufficiently, the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical 
behavior. 
 
 
4. Numerical analysis 
As the analysis in the previous section shows, the mobility and income inequality depend on 
population dynamics. In this section, we use numerical analysis to illustrate the Proposition 4 and 
to show complex the transitional dynamics of the economy with population dynamics. We take 
the parameter values to satisfy 𝑛𝑡𝑖 < 1 𝛾⁄ . Except for 𝐴 = 50 and 𝛽 = 0.5, they are given by 𝛼 = 0.5, 𝛾 = 0.3, 𝜃 = 5, 𝜃 = 1 following Maoz and Moav (1999) and Nakamura (2018). 
 
4.1 Constant population growth (𝝈 = 𝟏) 
When 𝜎 = 1 , the fertility between income classes is the same, that is, population growth is 
constant. We analyze it as the benchmark case. Fig.1 demonstrates the transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡 in the case of constant population growth. When the fertility between income classes, the 
population growth does not influence the basic dynamics of 𝜆𝑡, and therefore economy has not 
population effect in Fig.1.  
In Fig.1(a), the educated share monotonically increases with upward mobility and 
therefore income inequality decreases. If initial educated share is small and education cost is large 
sufficiently, as can be shown in Fig.1(b), the educated share does not change in the long run since 
there is no population effect. However, if initial the educated share is large sufficiently, the 
educated share increases with upward mobility. As a result, the mobility approaches toward steady 
state. 
 
Numerical result 1 When 𝜎 = 1, the economy has no population effect. If the education 
cost is high and hence upward-mobility does not occur at an early stage of the economy, the 
economy does not develop at all since there is no population effect. In contrast, if the upward-
mobility occurs, the mobility and income inequality monotonically approach steady state.  
 
[ Insert Fig.1 about here] 
 
4.2 Increasing population growth (𝝈 < 𝟏) 
When 𝜎 < 1, the fertility of the educated is larger than that of the uneducated, and therefore 
population growth increases with increase in the educated share. Increase in population growth 
discourages the mobility due to decreasing (positive) population effect for the educated share and 
transfer per child.  
Fig.2 illustrates the transitional dynamics of mobility when 𝜎 < 1. As can be shown in 
Fig.2(a), when the elasticity of substitution is small sufficiently, that is, population growth greatly 
increases with increase in the educates share, the mobility exhibits cyclical behavior. The intuition 
behind the cyclical behavior is as follows. When 𝜆𝑡 is small, education cost is also small. 
Although the educated have many children, many children born to the educates acquire education 
since educated worker’s wages is high and therefore children born to the educated receive a large 
enough transfer. The gross downward-mobility is negative due to population effect. It implies that 
the educated increases due to population effect. In addition, since the elasticity of substitution is 
small, the fertility of the uneducated is also small. This encourages upward-mobility since each 
individual born to the uneducated receives larger transfer per child. In summary, when 𝜆𝑡 is 
small, the educated share greatly increases due to population effect and upward-mobility. This 
sharp increase in 𝜆𝑡 , in turn, increases education cost and population growth. Increase in 
population discourages the mobility growth due to decreasing average transfer and population 
effect. As a result, 𝜆𝑡 in next period decreases due to increase in population growth and education 
cost. These observations explain the cyclical behavior. 
 Fig.2(b) and Fig.2(c) demonstrates the dynamics of 𝜎 = 0.75  and 𝜎 = 0.95 , 
respectively. As the elasticity of substitution approaches unity, the direct and indirect effect of 
population growth on the mobility is smaller. Thus, when 𝜎 = 0.75, the fluctuations of economy 
are smaller. When value of the elasticity of substitution is almost unity (𝜎 = 0.95), the mobility 
monotonically increases since differential fertility between income classes is quite small.  
 Finally, as shown in Proposition 3, we illustrate that the economy does not fall into 
poverty trap when 𝜎 < 1. Fig.2(d) demonstrates that education cost is high sufficiently and hence 
there is no upward mobility at an early stage of economy. In contrast to Fig.1 (b) in the case of 𝜎 = 1, the economy develops due to population effect without falling into the poverty trap. We 
summarize the results below. 
 
Numerical result 2 When the elasticity of substitution is smaller than unity, as the 
elasticity approaches toward unity, the transitional dynamics of mobility changes from non-
monotonous behavior to monotonous behavior and the educated share in steady state is larger 
since the effect of population dynamics on the mobility is smaller. In addition, even if the 
education cost is high and hence upward-mobility does not occur at an early stage of the economy, 
the economy does not fall into poverty trap due to population effect. 
 
[ Insert Fig.2 about here] 
 4.3 Decreasing population growth (𝝈 > 𝟏) 
When 𝜎 > 1, the fertility of the uneducated is larger than that of the educated, and therefore 
population growth decreases with increase in the educated share. Decrease in population growth 
encourages the mobility due to decreasing (negative) population effect for the educated share and 
increasing transfer per child.  
Fig.3 illustrates the transitional dynamics of mobility when 𝜎 = 1.3 and  𝜎 = 1.6 , 
respectively. When 𝜎 > 1 , the gross downward-mobility is positive value due to population 
effect. Thus, if the upward-mobility does not occur at an early stage of the economy, in other 
words, if 𝜆𝑡 < 𝜆1∗  , then the economy falls into poverty trap. If 𝜆𝑡 > 𝜆1∗  , the educated share 
increases and hence the economy converges to 𝜆2∗   with decrease in income inequality and 
population growth. 
 When 𝜎 > 1 , since increase in 𝜎  increases the fertility of the uneducated and 
(negative) population effect and hence discourages the upward mobility and facilitates downward-
mobility, it promotes the economy into poverty trap as can be shown in Fig.3(b). In addition, when 
the larger 𝜎 > 1 , the fertility of uneducated rapidly decreases with increase in uneducated 
worker’s wage due to increase in the educated share and hence the upward-mobility sharply 
increases. Hence, when the larger 𝜎 > 1, the educated share increases in both high-equilibrium 
and low-equilibrium and therefore population growth and income inequality is lower in both 
equilibriums. In summary, we have the following the result. 
 
Numerical result 3 When the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, the economy 
has three equilibrium: the stable high-equilibrium with low population growth and income 
inequality, the unstable low-equilibrium with high population growth and income inequality and 
poverty trap equilibrium, where the educated share is zero in the long run. As the elasticity of 
substitution increases, when the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution promotes the economy into poverty trap, while the educated share in the 
equilibrium increases due to rapid decrease in the fertility of the uneducated with income, and 
therefore population growth and income inequality decrease in the equilibrium. 
 
[ Insert Fig.3 about here] 
 
 Then, suppose that the upward mobility occurs at an early of the economy, that is, the 
economy does not fall into poverty trap. A policy to get out of poverty trap is for the government 
to reduce the education cost for individuals with high ability. To simplify the analysis, we assume 
that the government reduce the education cost for individuals with high ability 𝜃 to encourage 
the upward-mobility.  
As can be shown in Fig.4 compared to Fig.3, Upward-mobility occurs at an early of the 
economy and therefore the economy develops without falling into poverty trap. Hence, it is 
important that the government supports individual with high ability so that the economy does not 
fall into the poverty trap. However, even if the government implements such a policy, the 
economy may converge to stable low-equilibrium, that is, the economy may fall into development 
trap, when 𝜎 is large significantly as can be illustrated in Fig.5. Hence, multiple steady states 
appear in the economy when 𝜎 is large significantly: the high steady state with low population 
growth and small income inequality and the low steady state with high population growth and 
income inequality. 
 
[ Insert Fig.4 about here] 
 
The intuition behind the multiple steady states appear as follows. Although high ability 
children born to the uneducated become the educated since ℎ𝑡 is low, the larger fertility of the 
uneducated discourages the upward-mobility due to larger 𝜎. In addition, larger population effect 
increases significantly gross downward-mobility due to low the fertility of the educated and high 
population growth. As a result, the economy falls into development trap since gross downward 
mobility is larger than upward-mobility. When the economy develops sufficiently, the fertility of 
the uneducated sharply decreases with increase in wage and therefore the transfer per child 
sharply increases. Increase in them encourages upward-mobility. In contrast, since the difference 
between the fertility of the educated and population growth with economic development, 
population growth effect decreases and therefore gross downward-mobility also decreases. As a 
result, the economy develops and converges the high steady state since upward-mobility is larger 
than gross downward-mobility. Hence, the rapid change in population dynamics with economic 
development generates the multiple steady states. This result implies that population dynamics 
plays a crucial role in the mobility and economic development. In summary, we have the 
following the result. 
 
Numerical result 4 If the government implements a policy to support individuals with 
high ability, then the economy can get out of the poverty trap. However, when the elasticity of 
substitution is larger significantly, the economy has low steady state with higher population 
growth and income inequality and high steady state with lower population growth and income 
inequality due to rapid change in population dynamics. 
 
[ Insert Fig.5 about here] 
  
5. Conclusions 
As many studies indicate, the fertility influences significantly intergenerational mobility. 
Incorporating (endogenous) differential fertility into overlapping generations model, this paper 
analyzes the effect of population dynamics on the mobility, income inequality and economic 
development and shows their interactions. Population dynamics has two effect on the economy: 
the direct effect on the educated share through changing population size of the economy as a 
whole, and the indirect effect on the educated share through increasing/decreasing transfer per 
child. When the elasticity of substitution is enough larger than unity, i.e., the fertility of the 
educated is enough larger than that of the uneducated and therefore population growth increases 
sufficiently, the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior due to rapidly 
decreasing population effect and transfer per child. In contrast, when the elasticity of substitution 
is enough smaller than unity, i.e., the fertility of the uneducated is enough larger than that of the 
educated and therefore population growth decreases sufficiently, the mobility and income 
inequality monotonically approach steady state and the economy may have two steady state: low 
steady state with high population growth and income inequality, and high steady state with low 
population growth and income inequality. As a result, this show that population dynamics with 
differential fertility plays crucial role in transitional dynamics of mobility and economic 
development. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(a) 𝑎 = 0.03, 𝑏 = 0.02, (𝜆∗ = 0.3895, 𝑛∗ = 1.667) 
(b) 𝑎 = 0.1, 𝑏 = 0.03, (𝜆∗ = 0.2743, 𝑛∗ = 1.667) 
Fig.1 The transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡 when 𝜎 = 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(c) 𝜎 = 0.95, (𝜆∗ = 0.3017   ?̅?∗ = 1.7148) 
 
(d) 𝜎 = 0.95, (𝜆∗ = 0.3017   ?̅?∗ = 1.7148) 
(a) 𝜎 = 0.5, (𝜆∗ = 0.17092,   ?̅?∗ = 1.9872) (b) 𝜎 = 0.75, (𝜆∗ = 0.2427,   ?̅?∗ = 1.8790) 
Fig.2 The transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡 when 𝜎 < 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig.3 The transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡 when 𝜎 > 1 
(a) 𝜎 = 1.3,  (𝜆1∗ = 0.0891 ,  ?̅?1∗ = 1.5775,   𝜆2∗ = 0.0891 ,  ?̅?2∗ = 1.5775 ) 
(b) 𝜎 = 1.6,  (𝜆1∗ = 0.2129 ,  ?̅?1∗ = 1.2185,   𝜆2∗ = 0.4303 ,  ?̅?2∗= 1.0477 ) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig.4 The transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡  
when 𝜎 = 1.6 and 𝜃 = 0.5, 𝑎 = 0.03, 𝑏 = 0.02, (𝜆∗ = 0.4374 , ?̅?∗ = 1.0409) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig.5 The transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡  
when 𝜎 = 2.3 and 𝜃 = 0.5, 𝑎 = 0.03, 𝑏 = 0.02 
 
(a) Transitional dynamics of 𝜆𝑡  
(b) 𝑈𝑀𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝑀𝑡   
Table.1 The values of 𝝀𝒕 and ?̅?𝒕 in steady state in Fig.5 
𝜆𝑡 in steady state ?̅?𝑡 in steady state 
𝜆1∗ = 0.0350 ?̅?1∗ = 1.9571 𝜆2∗ = 0.1351 ?̅?2∗ = 1.1036 𝜆3∗ = 0.2598 ?̅?3∗ = 0.7175 𝜆4∗ = 0.4794 ?̅?4∗ = 0.5084 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
References 
Aso, H. and Nakamura, T. (2019) “Population growth and intergenerational mobility”, Applied 
Economics Letters, forthcoming. 
Becker, G.S. and Tomes, N. (1979) “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and 
Intergenerational Mobility”, Journal of Political Economy, 87:1153-1189. 
Bernasconi, M. and Profeta, P. (2012) “Public education and redistribution when talents are 
mismatched”, European Economic Review, 56: 84-96. 
Bork, R. (2011). “Federalism, Fertility, and Growth”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
113:30-54. 
Bratberg, E. Nilsen, Ø. A. and Vaage, K. (2007) “Trends in Intergenerational Mobility across 
Offspring’s Earnings Distribution in Norway”, Industrial Relations, 46: 112-119. 
Davies, J.B., Zhang, J. and Zeng, J. (2005) “Intergenerational mobility under private vs public 
education”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107:399-417. 
De la Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2003) “Inequality and growth: why differential fertility 
matters”, American Economic Review, 93: 1091-1113. 
De la Croix, D. and Doepke, M. (2004) “Public versus private education when differential 
fertility matters”, Journal of Development Economics, 73: 607-629. 
Galor O, Zeira J (1993) Income distribution and macroeconomics, Review of Economi Studies, 
60(1): 35-52 
Hassler, J. R., Mora, J. V. and Zeira, J. (2007) “Inequality and mobility”, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 12: 235-259. 
Iyigun, M.F. (1999) “Public education and intergenerational economic mobility”, International 
Economic Review, 40: 697-710. 
Lindahl, L. (2008) “Do birth order and family size matter for intergenerational income 
mobility? Evidence from Sweden”, Applied Economics, 40: 2239-2257. 
Maoz, Y. D. and Moav, O. (1999). “Intergenerational mobility and the process of development”, 
Economic Journal, 109: 677-697. 
Nakamura, T. (2018) “Solow meets Stone-Geary: Technological progress and the demographic 
transition”, Metroeconomica, 69: 768-790. 
Nakamura, T. and Murayama, Y. (2011). “Education cost, intergenerational mobility and income 
inequality”, Economics Letters 112: 266-269. 
Nicoletti, S. and Ermisch, J. (2007). “Intergenerational earnings mobility: changes across 
cohorts in Britain”, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 7(2). 
Owen A. L. and Weil, D. N. (1998) “Intergenerational earnings mobility, inequality and 
growth”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 41: 71-104. 
 
Skirbekk, V. (2008). “Fertility trends by social status”, Demographic research, 18: 145-180.  
Uchida, Y. (2018) “Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents”, Economic Theory, 
65: 575-607. 
Van Bavel, J. (2006) “The effect of fertility limitation on intergenerational social mobility: the 
quality-quantity trade-off during the demographic transition”, Journal of Biosocial Science 
38(4): 553-569. 
Van Bavel, J., Moreels, S., Van de Putte, B., and Matthijs, K. (2011) “Family size and 
intergenerational social mobility during the fertility transition: Evidence of resource dilution 
from the city of Antwerp in nineteenth century Belgium”, Demographic Research 27(14): 
313-344. 
